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I. INTRODUCTION
City of Riverside v. RiveraI is the Supreme Court's latest attempt
to define a "reasonable" attorney's fee under the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act (Fees Act).2 In Rivera, the Court affirmed a
fee award of approximately $245,000 despite the fact that the plaintiffs
recovered only $33,350 in damages. In so doing, the Court missed an
opportunity to provide a measure of objective force to the definition of
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the guidelines for determin-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee under the Fees Act. First, the Note
will examine the legislative history of the Fees Act as well as judicial
interpretation of the definition of a reasonable fee. Second, the vari-
1. 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The Fees Act states in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et
seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.],
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
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ous opinions filed in Rivera will be outlined and analyzed. Finally, the
Note proposes legislative reform that would require a more objective
definition of reasonableness.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
The enactment of the Fees Act was Congress' response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Aleyaska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society.3 The Court in Aleyaska reaffirmed the "American Rule"
regarding attorney's fees and held that only Congress may authorize
exceptions to the general rule that a litigant bear the expense of his
own attorney's fees.4 Congress immediately responded to the decision
by passing the Fees Act.5 Congress reasoned that the decision in
Aleyaska had left "anomalous gaps" in the civil rights laws6 and char-
acterized the Fees Act as "an appropriate response to the Aleyaska
decision."
7
Congress cited several policy reasons for allowing "fee shifting"s in
civil rights litigation. Congress recognized that the majority of civil
rights violations affect those who cannot afford an attorney, and by
enacting the Fees Act,9 sought to ensure effective access to 'the courts
to all those harmed by civil rights violations.10 Congress also recog-
nized that by allowing fee shifting arrangements in civil rights cases, it
could guarantee vigorous enforcement of civil rights by private sector
attorneys thereby reducing the need for reliance upon government
agencies."1
The legislative history of the Fees Act provides rudimentary guide-
lines to assist courts in determining a reasonable fee. Congress' basic
mandate, as stated in the Senate Report, was that fee awards should
be adequate to attract competent counsel, but should not produce
windfall profits for attorneys.'2 Prevailing civil rights attorneys were
3. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
4. Id. at 247.
5. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5908 [hereinafter Senate Report].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5912.
8. Fee shifting is the legal term describing the practice of requiring the adversarial
party to pay the costs of litigation, including attorney's fees.
9. H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter House Report].
10. Id.
11. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEvS at 5913. See also Comment, The Contingency Factor and the Attorneys Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Legislative History Requires Continued Application, 26
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 193, 200 (1986) (provides short discussion describing the
Fees Act as a practical tool to ensure vigorous private sector enforcement of civil
rights while avoiding complete reliance on governmental agencies).
12. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5913. The report states:
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to be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying
client, "for all time reasonably expended on a matter."13
Congress cited Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,14 as es-
tablishing the appropriate standards for determining a reasonable at-
torney's fee.15 In Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit established twelve factors for lower courts to consider in
computing a reasonable fee award.16 The court in Johnson, however,
failed to adequately explain how each of these factors was to be ap-
plied. Consequently, courts have had a difficult time articulating clear
standards for defining a reasonable attorney's fee.
The question of how the Johnson factors were to be applied was
partially answered by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart.17
Hensley established that the "lodestar" figure was the most useful
starting point in determining a reasonable attorney's fee.' 8 The lode-
star figure is determined by multiplying the number of hours reason-
ably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. The
Hensley Court went on to state that the lower courts could consider
the Johnson factors in adjusting either upward or downward the lode-
star figure.19 Among the Johnson factors to be considered was the
It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 be governed
by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex
Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because the
rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature. The appropriate stan-
dards, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974), are correctly applied in such cases as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64
F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. 9444
(C.D. Cal. 1974); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975). These cases have resulted in fees
which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not pro-
duce windfalls to attorneys. In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing
parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a
fee-paying client, "for all times reasonably expended on a matter." Da-
vis, supra; Stanford Daily, supra, at 684.
13. Id.
14. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
15. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5913.
16. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
These factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the na-
ture and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases.
17. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
18. Id. at 433.
19. Id, at 434.
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"important factor of the 'results obtained.' "20 The Court in Hensley
also emphasized that when a plaintiff succeeds on only some of his
claims, it may not be appropriate for his attorney to receive compensa-
tion for hours spent litigating unsuccessful claims.21 In making the
determination as to whether the attorney will receive full compensa-
tion, the Court stated that lower courts were to focus on the relation-
ship between successful and unsuccessful claims, the significance of
the overall success achieved by the plantiff, and whether the claims
arose from a "common core of facts."22
Hensley therefore stands for the proposition that the lodestar fig-
ure is the most appropriate measure of a proper attorney's fee and that
the Johnson factors could be considered as multipliers to the lodestar
figure. Although the Court had hinted that many of the Johnson fac-
tors were subsumed in the lodestar figure,23 it did not affirmatively
answer how the Johnson factors were to be considered until later.
That question was answered in Blum v. Stenson.24
In Blum, the Supreme Court addressed whether the lower court
had abused its discretion by granting a fifty percent upward adjust-
ment to the lodestar figure.25 While the Court rejected petitioner's
argument that upward adjustments to the lodestar were never permis-
sible,26 the Court accepted petitioner's argument that the facts of the
particular case did not justify an upward adjustment.27 The Court said
the multipliers used by the district court were presumably already
contained in the lodestar.28 Specifically, the Court found that the nov-
elty and complexity of the issues presented in the action were presum-
ably reflected in the number of billable hours and were not an
appropriate basis for an adjustment of the fee.2 9 The Court also noted
that the quality of representation generally is reflected in the reason-
able hourly rate.3 0 Furthermore, because the "results obtained" gen-
erally will be subsumed within other factors used to calculate a
20. 1&
21. Id at 435.
22. Id at 435-36.
23. Id at 434 n.9. The Court, foreshadowing its subsequent decision in Blum v. Sten-
son, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), did caution lower courts that many of the Johnson factors
were already subsumed in the lodestar figure.
24. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
25. Id at 896.
26. IM at 897. The Court relied on its holding in Hensley which stated that upward
adjustments to the lodestar may be justified in cases of exceptional success.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).
27. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-902 (1984).
28. The district court considered the complexity of the litigation, the novelty of the
issues, the high quality of the representation, the results obtained, and the riski-
ness of the action. Id at 898.
29. Id- at 898-99.
30. Id at 899.
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reasonable fee, the Court reasoned that this factor should normally
not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award.3 1 Thus,
the Blum decision severely limits the continued viability of the John-
son factors as multipliers to be used for an adjustment of the lodestar
figure,3 2 and the lodestar figure is now strongly presumed to be the
reasonable fee.
III. THE FACTS OF CITY OF RIVERSIDE V. RIVERA.
Against this backdrop of legislative and judicial history, City of
Riverside v. Rivera reached and was decided by the Supreme Court.
The case was originally brought in Federal district court by a group of
eight Chicano individuals who attended a party in Riverside, Califor-
nia. A large number of police officers, acting without a warrant, broke
up the party using tear gas and "unnecessary physical force." 33 Sev-
eral of the party-goers were arrested. The district court later found
that the party was not creating a disturbance in the community at the
time of the police action. Also, all criminal charges against the ar-
restees were eventually dropped for lack of probable cause.
The individuals arrested sued the City of Riverside, its chief of po-
lice, and thirty individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
1985(3), and 1986 for violating their first, fourth, and fourteenth
amendment rights. The petition also sought damages on various state
claims alleging negligence, false arrest, and false imprisonment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of seventeen of the
defendant police officers. The case eventually went to trial with the
jury returning verdicts against only five of the police officers and the
City of Riverside.
Specifically, the jury found that the City and three of the police
officers had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and awarded $13,300 in compen-
satory and punitive damages for violations of the plaintiffs' civil rights.
The jury also found that the City and five of its police officers had
committed various acts of common law negligence, false arrest, and
false imprisonment and awarded plaintiffs' $20,050 in damages on
their state claims for total damages of $33,350. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
31. M at 890.
32. The only Johnson factors that realistically survive the Blum decision are the "re-
sults obtained" and the "contingent nature of the litigation." Hensley and Blum
indicate that an upward adjustment of the lodestar may be appropriate in cases of
exceptional success. What constitutes exceptional success, nonetheless, remains
unclear. The Blum Court decided not to address whether the "contingent nature
of the lawsuit" would justify an upward adjustment to the lodestar. Specifically,
the Court said, "We have no occasion in this case to consider whether the risk of
not being the prevailing party in a § 1983 case, and therefore not being entitled to
an award of attorney's fees from one's adversary, may ever justify an upward fee
adjustment." Id at 886 n.17.
33. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2689 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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§ 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, the district court
awarded the prevailing plaintiffs $245,456.26 in attorney's fees.
34
Defendants appealed only the fee award to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which affirmed the award.35 De-
fendants then sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the writ, vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the in-
tervening decision in Hensley.3 6 On remand, the district court, after
holding two additional hearings, again concluded that plantiffs were
entitled to a fee award of $245,456.25. The court of appeals again af-
firmed the trial court, holding that "the district court correctly recon-
sidered the case in light of H ley... ."37 Defendants again sought a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court maintaining that the district
court's award was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fees
Act, and the writ was again granted.38 Although no opinion spoke for
a majority of the Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the fee award.
39
IV. THE OPINIONS IN CITY OF RIVERSIDE V. RIVERA
A. The Plurality
Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, stated that the issue in the case was "whether
an award of attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is per se 'unreasona-
ble' within the meaning of the statute if it exceeds the amount of dam-
ages recovered by the plaintiff in the underlying civil rights action."40
The plurality opinion rejected the defendants' argument that likened
a civil rights action to a private tort suit benefiting only the individual
litigants involved. Brennan wrote, "Unlike most private tort litigants,
a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitu-
tional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms."41
The plurality added that the plaintiff in a civil rights action acts as
a "private attorney general" vindicating policies that Congress has
34. The fee award was based on 1,946.75 hours expended by plaintiff's two attorneys
at a rate of $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at a rate of $25
per hour. Id. at 2690 (plurality opinion).
35. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982).
36. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 461 U.S. 952 (1983).
37. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 763 F.2d 1580, 1582 (9th Cir. 1985).
38. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985).
39. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986).
40. Id. at 2689 (plurality opinion). Stating the issue in this manner leads almost inev-
itably to the conclusion that the award of attorneys' fees in this case was reason-
able due to the legislative history of the Fees Act which indicates that monetary
damages are not a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees. Senate Report,
supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5913.
41. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2695 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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deemed of the highest importance. 42 The plurality, after a brief dis-
cussion of the legislative history, concluded, "Thus, Congress recog-
nized that reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988 are not conditioned
upon and need not be proportionate to an award of money damages." 43
The plurality also stressed that a rule of proportionality would se-
riously undermine Congress' purpose in passing the Fees Act.44 The
plurality emphasized that the Fees Act was intended to encourage the
bringing of meritorious civil rights claims by removing the financial
barrier surrounding the necessity of hiring competent counsel.45 Fur-
thermore, private-sector fee arrangements such as those used in the
tort field were deemed insufficient to attract competent counsel in the
civil rights area.4 6 Therefore, in order to attract competent counsel
and to guarantee sufficiently vigorous enforcement of civil rights, the
plurality rejected the rule that attorney's fees must be proportionate
to the damages awarded in a civil rights action.
B. The Concurrence
Justice Powell, though not convinced the fee award was fair, de-
ferred to the judgment of the lower courts because he was unable to
conclude that the detailed findings of fact made by the district court
and approved by the court of appeals were clearly erroneous.
47 Jus-
tice Powell also gave brief consideration to the substantive issues in
the case and concluded that neither Supreme Court decisions nor the
legislative history of the Fees Act supported a rule of proportionality
between fees awarded and damages recovered in a civil rights case.
48
42. Id at 2695 (plurality opinion) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
2 (1976)).
43. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2695 (1986) (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 2696 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 2696-97 (plurality opinion). The plurality stressed that civil rights actions
often require substantial effort but offer only nominal or minimal damages. Pri-
vate sector fee arrangements where the prevailing attorney takes a certain per-
centage of the judgment were classified as insufficient to guarantee vigorous
enforcement of civil rights due to the minimal damages usually available.
47. Id. at 2699 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell said,
In sum, despite serious doubts as to the fairness of the fees awarded in
this case, I cannot conclude that the detailed findings made by the Dis-
trict Court, and accepted by the Court of Appeals, were clearly errone-
ous, or that the District Court abused its discretion in making this fee
award.
Id. at 2700 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's argument can be summa-
rized in his belief that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous for the
purposes of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
48. Id (Powell, J., concurring).
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C. The Dissents
Chief Justice Burger, joined in the dissent of Justice Rehnquist,
but also wrote a short, vigorous dissent. The Chief Justice, exasper-
ated over the size of the fee award, said, "I write only to add that it
would be difficult to find a better example of legal nonsense than the
fixing of attorney's fees by a judge at $245,456.25 for the recovery of
$33,350 damages." 49 Stating that he viewed the fee award as a grave
abuse of discretion, the Chief Justice predicted that the Court's result
"will unfortunately only add fuel to the fires of public indignation
over the costs of litigation."50
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White,
and Justice O'Conner, delivered the second dissenting opinion in the
case. The Rehnquist dissent relied on the Court's earlier decision in
HensZey. While recognizing that under Hensley the lower courts were
to use the lodestar figure as the most useful starting point in deter-
mining a fee award, the Rehnquist dissent pointed out that the Hens-
ley Court had cautioned the district courts against including in the
initial fee calculation hours not "reasonably expended" on the litiga-
tion.51 Rehnquist said he could find no escape from the conclusion
that the district court's finding that plantiffs' attorneys reasonably
spent 1,946.75 hours to recover $33,350 in damages was clearly errone-
ous. Rehnquist, dismayed by the size of the award, added, "The
Court's affirmance of the fee award emasculates the principles laid
down in Hensley and turns § 1988 into a relief act for lawyers." 52
Rehnquist continued his argument by accusing the trial court of
not seriously considering the propriety of the fee award in light of the
Hensley decision. Rehnquist stated that the district court viewed Hens-
49. Id. at 2701 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). While the Chief Justice's opinion can be criticized
as rhetorical and shallow, it does have a simplistic appeal. If a fee award of
roughly $245,000 is "reasonable" when the only relief obtained is $33,000, one can
certainly wonder if there would ever be a fee award the Court considered
"unreasonable."
51. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2701-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist later points out hours he
considers unreasonable on their face and prime examples of the attorneys lack of
proper "billing judgment." The examples are:
(1) The court approved almost 209 hours of "prelitigation time," for a
total of $26,118.75. (2) The court approved some 197 hours of time spent
in conversations between respondents' two attorneys, for a total of
$24,625. (3) The court approved 143 hours for preparation of a pre-trial
order, for a total of $17,875.00. (4) Perhaps most egregiously, the court
approved 45.50 hours of "stand-by time," or time spent by one of the re-
spondents' attorneys, who was then based in San Diego, to wait in a Los
Angeles hotel room for a jury verdict to be rendered in Los Angeles,
when his co-counsel was then employed by the UCLA School of Law,
less than 40 minutes' driving time from the courthouse.
Id at 2702-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ley not as a constraint on its discretion, but as a blueprint for justify-
ing, after-the-fact, a fee award it had already decided to enter solely on
the basis of the lodestar figure. Rehnquist further accused the trial
court of failing to seriously consider the "results obtained" which
Hensley described as the important factor in determining a reasonable
fee award.53
Rehnquist, in a more substantive argument, stated that the "rea-
sonableness" of a fee award must be determined in light of both tradi-
tional billing practices in the legal profession, and in consideration of
what would have been deemed reasonable if billed to affluent clients
by their own attorneys.5 4 Rehnquist said that this form of analysis
leads inevitably to the conclusion that the fee award in this case was
unreasonable.5 5 While admitting that under some circumstances5 6 at-
torney's fees could be greater than the underlying value of the litiga-
tion, the Rehnquist dissent stated that the plurality's attempt to
dismiss any relationship between the amount of time spent on a case
and the damages awarded was wholly unconvincing.57 In a concise
summary of the dissenters' position, Rehnquist stated,
One may agree with all the glowing rhetoric contained in the plurality's opin-
ion about Congress' noble purpose in authorizing attorney's fees under § 1988
without concluding that Congress intended to turn attorneys loose to spend as
many hours as possible to try a case that could reasonably be expected to re-
sult only in a relatively minor award of monetary damages. 5 8
V. ANALYSIS
A. Criticisms of Plurality and Concurrence
The plurality opinion gives the correct answer to the issue it ad-
dresses in this case, whether proportionality between fees awarded
and underlying damage recoveries is required by the Fees Act.59 By
53. Id. at 2702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist's argument does have some sup-
port in the trial court record. On remand, after convening a hearing concerning
the fee award, the trial judge announced, "I tell you now that I will not change
the award. I will simply go back and be more specific about it." Id (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
54. I& at 2703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist goes on to pose several hypotheticals
attempting to illustrate how attorneys in the private sector would never be justi-
fied in charging their clients more in attorney's fees than successful outcome of
the litigation could possibly yield.
56. Rehnquist admits that in certain instances, such as where the litigation is pro-
longed by the bad-faith conduct of the defendant or where the litigation produces
significant benefits for persons other than the individual plaintiffs, larger awards
of attorney's fees would be justified. Id. at 2704-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2705 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Id (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
59. The legislative history indicates that fully compensatory fee awards are available
even when the rights vindicated are non-pecuniary in nature and where only
[Vol. 66:808
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stating the issue in this manner, however, the plurality effectively
dodged the real issue presented by this case. The gravamen of the de-
fendants' argument was not that the Fees Act required mechanical
proportionality in awarding attorney's fees, but that there must be
some relationship between fees awarded and results obtained.60 In
fact, the defendants made it clear to the Court that they were not ar-
guing for a blanket rule of mechanical proportionality. 6' And yet,
Justice Brennan wrote, "[P]etioners and the Solicitor General submit
that attorney's fees in such cases should be proportionate to the
amount of damages a plantiff recovers. Specifically, they suggest that
fee awards in damages cases should be modeled upon the contingent
fee arrangements commonly used in personal injury litigation."
62 Jus-
tice Brennan's mischaracterization of the defendants' argument draws
suspicion to the integrity of the opinion and detracts from its
persuasiveness.
Justice Brennan's reason for focusing on the proportionality argu-
ment is obvious. By doing so, Brennan avoids having to address how
two attorneys can "reasonably" spend nearly 2,000 billable hours at a
rate of $125 per hour on a case where the only relief obtained was
$33,000 in damages. It is true that fee awards are available in cases
where only minimal damages are obtained.63 It is also true, however,
that both the legislative history64 and judicial interpretation 65 of the
Fees Act require courts to consider the important factor of the results
obtained in determining the reasonableness of the fee award.
An examination of the facts of this case indicates that the fee
award was grossly disproportionate to the overall relief obtained.
Although plantiffs initially brought claims against thirty-two defend-
ants, they prevailed against only six of those defendants. Seventeen of
the defendants were dismissed prior to trial and nine additional de-
fendants were exonerated at trial. Although plantiffs sought millions
of dollars in damages, they were awarded only $33,350 in damages,
$20,000 on their state law claims and only $13,350 on their civil rights
claims. To the extent plantiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, or any
type of relief other than money damages, these claims were dropped
prior to trial or were totally unsuccessful. Neither the City of River-
side, nor its police department was required to change any of its prac-
nominal damages are recovered. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in
1976 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS at 5913.
60. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986)
[hereinafter Reply Brief].
61. 1& "Petitioners do not now, and have never urged the adoption of a blanket rule
of 'mechanical proportionality' in awarding attorney's fees under § 1988."
62. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2694 (1986) (plurality opinion).
63. See supra note 59.
64. House Report, supra note 9, at 8.
65. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983).
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tices or policies. In short, it was a case that secured only monetary
relief for the individual plaintiffs with no specific benefits secured for
the public at large. Despite these facts, plantiffs' attorneys were com-
pensated to the minute for all the time they spent litigating the case.
Adding insult to injury, the two relatively novice attorneys 66 were
compensated at a rate of $125 per hour. All said and done, the plan-
tiffs' attorneys were awarded a fee of $245,000, roughly seven times
greater than the underlying damage recovery and almost twenty times
the amount recovered on plantiffs' civil rights claims.67
To be sure, a civil rights litigant in vindicating his civil rights may
produce indirect benefits for the general public.6 8 For instance, the
public obtains a psychological benefit in knowing that civil rights vio-
lations will not be ignored. Also, the award of attorney's fees has a
deterrent effect in ensuring that governmental entities will not violate
the civil rights of their citizens.6 9 The mere recitation of these bene-
fits should not, however, be used to dismiss any relationship between
the fees awarded and the results obtained. The gross disproportional-
ity between the fees awarded and the results obtained in this case
leads to the conclusion that the fee award was unreasonable. In find-
ing otherwise, the plurality dismisses the need for any relationship be-
tween overall relief and fees awarded and gives attorneys carte
blanche to spend as many hours as possible on their civil rights claims.
This policy is unsound. Recognizing that many civil rights viola-
tions are brought against governmental entities, one may certainly
wonder why taxpayers should be forced to pay exorbitant fee awards
to attorneys who could not command similar fees in the uncoerced
private market. 70 As stated by Massachusetts Attorney General,
Francis X. Bellotti, "I reject the notion that our commitment to assur-
ing the civil rights of the people is to be measured by our generosity to
66. The attorneys "total professional experience when this litigation began consisted
of Gerald Lopez' 1-year service as a law clerk to a judge and Roy Cazares' two
years' experience as a trial attorney in the Defenders' Program of San Diego
County." City of Riverside v. Rivera 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2701 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
67. For a catalogue of the facts quoted in this paragraph see Brief for Petitioners at 6-
8, City of Riverside v. Rivera 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
68. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2694 (1986) (plurality opinion).
69. Brief for Respondents at 45-46 n.81, City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686
(1986).
70. Smith, Stop Making Taxpayers Subsidize Activist Lawyers, ATTORNEY FEE
AWARDS REPORTER 4, 4 (June 1986). See also, Jacquette v. Black Hawk County,
Iowa, 710 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1983) (Bright, J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Bright wrote,
Unfortunately, nothing this court does can alter the fact that the real
losers in this case are the taxpayers who have had to pay the ultimate
cost of this litigation. This case emphasizes to judges and attorneys alike
the need to find ways to stem the inordinately high cost of litigation in
cases like Jacquette's.
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their lawyers."71 The Fees Act was simply not intended to create "a
civil rights fee bank to be liberally drawn upon by lawyers for their
own welfare."72 Unfortunately, the plurality opinion sanctions the
overzealous efforts of some civil rights attorneys who under the color
of public interest and through taxpayer subsidized litigation pad their
own bankrolls disregarding the benefits actually conferred upon their
clients and society.
73
Moreover, the problem of litigious attorneys is sharpened by the
fact that it is the prevailing plaintiff's opponent and not the client who
foots the bill in a civil rights action. A private sector attorney has suf-
ficient incentives to insure that hours billed to a client are reasonable.
In order to develop and retain satisfied clients, the private sector at-
torney must provide competent legal service at a competitive price.
The civil rights attorney, on the other hand, is bound by no such con-
straints because it is the adversary and not the client who pays the bill.
Thus, the civil rights attorney need not be concerned with the reason-
ableness of the fee and actually has the incentive to overlitigate a case.
As stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
[W]hen a lawyer is working for his own client he sensibly limits his research
and preparation in proportion to the magnitude of the results sought by his
client and his client's perceived ability and willingness to pay. No such con-
straints work on a civil rights plaintiff's counsel. Indeed, the temptation is
just the opposite. Since "the enemy" will be paying anyway, counsel is in-
duced to read every case, depose every witness, examine fully every tactic,
leave no stone unturned .... 74
The problem is further heightened by courts allowing civil rights
attorneys to recover for all time spent on unsuccessful claims if the
claims are somehow "related" or arose from the same "common core
of facts" as the claims ultimately prevailed upon.75 A finding that a
claim is related does not necessarily support a finding that time spent
litigating that claim was reasonable. In fact, an attorney is encouraged
to overzealously pursue claims that are not likely to succeed if the
attorney can be certain that the court will mechanically apply the
lodestar formula to all related claims.7 6 In light of the propensity of
71. Smith, supra note 70, at 4.
72. Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 1980).
73. Brief of Amici Curae by Congressman Thomas J. Biley, Jr., Philip M. Crane, Wil-
liam E. Dannemeyer, Newt Gingrich, and the Washington Legal Foundation in
Support of Petitioners at 6-8, City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986)
[hereinafter Congressional Brief].
74. Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Scott v. Bradley 455
F. Supp. 672, 675 (E.D. Va. 1978) (original emphasis deleted)).
75. Congressional Brief, supra note 73, at 8-9.
76. The policy of awarding attorney's fees for time spent litigating related claims led
District of Columbia Circuit Judge Wilkey to dissent to the court's approval of a
fee award of $160,000 for an underlying recovery of $31,000 in back pay in an
employment discrimination action. Judge Wilkey wrote,
This case illustrates the potential result when a large private firm, with
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some lower courts to indiscriminately award fees for all related claims
and the billing realities discussed above, the plurality seems all too
willing to assume that the time plantiffs' attorneys spent pursuing
their myriad claims was reasonable.
The plurality can be further criticized for approving a fee award
that was at least partially justified by the trial court on grounds that
were irrelevant, irrational, and unsupported by the record.77 The dis-
trict court justified the large fee award by stating that the dispropor-
tionality between the fee award and the underlying damage recovery
"resulted from (a) the general reluctance of jurors to make large
awards against police officers, and (b) the dignified restraint which the
plaintiffs exercised in describing their injuries to the jury."7 8 As the
defendants emphasized in their Reply Brief, however, the supposed
reluctance of jurors to return verdicts against police officers was ap-
parently not shared by the jurors in numerous other police brutality
cases tried in the federal courts.79 Furthermore, even if jurors are re-
luctant to return large verdicts against police officers, a court in
awarding attorney's fees does not sit to retry issues submitted to the
jury and "has no business trying to correct what it regards as an unfor-
tunate tendency in the award of damages by granting inflated attor-
ney's fees."
8 0
high rates customarily charged to wealthy corporate clients, brings a suit
against a Government defendant with an unlimited deep pocket, and
then proceeds to engage in extensive discovery and numerous pretrial
motions, while being assured from the outset that all hours spent on the
case will be reimbursed at the firm's customary rate so long as its efforts
are relevant to issues on which it ultimately prevails. It is of little use to
quibble over whether the amount of equitable relief involved in this par-
ticular case can possibly justify the high fee, because the situation in this
case foreshadows and points the way toward far greater potential abuses
in the future, if the hourly rate times hours formula continues to be
mechanically applied.
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Judge Wilkey added, "In our colleagues' 'lodestar' opinion, the path of attorney's
fees in Title VII litigation is easy to discern. It is Up, Up, and Away! It is Per
Calculos Ad Astra." Id. at 908 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
77. Congressional Brief, supra note 73, at 21-25.
78. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1986) (plurality opinion).
79. Reply Brief, supra note 60, at 17. The cases cited by petitioners are:
Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
($3,000,000); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)
($1,590,670); Estate of Davis v. Hazen, 582 F. Supp. 938 (C.D. Ill. 1983)
($575,000); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) ($300,000);
Smith v. Heath, 517 F. Supp. 774 (D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd 691 F.2d 220 (6th
Cir. 1981) ($132,000); Spears v. Conlish, 440 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
($100,000 assessed against a single police officer); Bruner v. Dunaway,
684 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1982) cert denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983) ($100,000);
Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983) ($310,000 in punitive
damages against a local sheriff and deputy).
80. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2703 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The second factor relied on by the trial court to justify the minimal
damage award was the dignified restraint exercised by plaintiffs' coun-
sel in presenting their case to the jury. However, the restraint exer-
cised by counsel in presenting their case is an irrelevant factor when
deciding whether the minimal results obtained justified the huge fee
award8s The restraint plaintiffs' counsel supposedly used in present-
ing their case to the jury was merely a tactical decision and perhaps a
poor one judging by the size of the jury award. Nevertheless, the trial
judge turned what was probably a tactical error into a justification for
a huge fee award. This peculiar rationalization is a prime example of
the trial court's strained effort to justify its fee award. Based on such
reasoning, Justice Rehnquist was forced to conclude, "It is obvious to
me that the District Court viewed Hensley not as a constraint on its
discretion, but instead as a blueprint for justifying, in an after-the-fact
fashion, a fee award it had already decided to enter solely on the basis
of the 'lodestar.' "82 The plurality, on the other hand, overlooked the
strained reasoning of the trial court in reaching its conclusion that the
findings of the trial court were not "clearly erroneous." 3
Justice Powell's concurrence is also unpersuasive. While trial
courts are given wide discretion in determining a reasonable fee, such
discretion is not absolute.8 4 Hensley specifically directed trial courts
to consider the important factor of the results obtained.85 In light of
the disproportionality between the results obtained and the fee award
in this case, Justice Powell's statement that he could not conclude that
the trial court's "detailed" findings were "clearly erroneous" is uncon-
vincing. The opinion provides trial courts desirous of providing civil
rights attorneys exorbitant fees with a foolproof method of assuring
affirmance on appeal. Under Powell's view, a trial court need only
recite those factors that have traditionally justified full fee recoveries
and the court's findings will be protected on appeal by the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Justice
Powell's restrained concurrence, coupled with the generosity of the
plurality opinion, ensures civil rights attorneys that even grossly dis-
proportionate fees will be upheld by the Supreme Court so long as the
trial court protects itself by creating an appropriate "paper trail" in
support of the fee award.
81. Congressional Brief, supra note 73, at 23-24.
82. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2702 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. d. at 2693 (plurality opinion).
84. "The court necessarily has the discretion in making the equitable judgment. This
discretion however must be exercised in light of the considerations we have iden-
tified." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
85. Id at 434.
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B. Defense of Dissenters' Position
Of all the opinions in Rivera, Justice Rehnquist's dissent is the
most persuasive. Rehnquist argues that an attorney exercising reason-
able billing judgment could not possibly spend nearly 2,000 billable
hours at a rate of $125 per hour on litigation that produced only
$33,000 in monetary relief and no specific, identifiable benefits for per-
sons other than the individual plaintiffs. If the term "reasonable" is to
have any meaning within the fee award context, Rehnquist argues
that courts must not continue to permit fee awards grossly dispropor-
tionate to the overall relief obtained.
The same arguments used to criticize the opinion of the plurality
support Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the fee award in this case
was unreasonable. Rehnquist's strongest argument is that there was a
total lack of billing judgment on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel in
this case.8 6 Beginning with the proposition that hours not properly
billed to one's client are not properly billed to one's adversary, Rehn-
quist builds a strong case that the fee award in this case was
unreasonable.8 7
According to Rehnquist, an important factor in determining the
reasonableness of the hours expended is the amount that can reason-
ably be expected to be recovered if the plaintiff prevails.88 Just as a
private sector attorney sensibly limits his research in light of the po-
tential benefits, so too should a civil rights attorney. Thus, a civil
rights attorney is justified in expending billable hours on a case up to
the point where the benefits for his client and the public outweigh the
costs associated with procuring those benefits. Hours expended be-
yond that point creates litigation primarily for the benefit of the
attorney.
The question then becomes how to value the intangible, non-pecu-
niary value of a civil right and the indirect societal benefits produced
by civil rights litigation. Rehnquist's dissent takes the position that
even though these benefits are difficult to measure, this fact cannot be
used to dismiss the need for any relationship between the actual tangi-
ble results achieved and the fees requested.8 9 In this case, a fee award
roughly seven times greater than the total recovery and nearly twenty
times greater than the recovery on plaintiffs' civil rights claims was
beyond that which the dissent could term reasonable. 90 By placing
outer limits on the definition of a reasonable fee, the dissent takes into
account both of Congress' purposes in enacting the Fees Act, promot-
ing the vindication of civil rights while preventing windfalls to
86. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2703 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2704 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2705 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id at 2703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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attorneys.91
To the extent Justice Rehnquist's hypotheticals comparing civil
rights actions to purely private litigation imply that the amount recov-
ered in a civil rights action should be an absolute cap on a reasonable
attorneys fee,92 the opinion can be criticized. The non-pecuniary bene-
fits should be given some weight in determining a reasonable fee. As
previously stated, however, the non-pecuniary benefits should not dis-
miss the need for any relationship between fees awarded and the
amount recovered. A sound approach to the problem of a dispropor-
tionate fee request in light of the results obtained is illustrated by Jac-
quette v. Black Hawk County, Iowa,93 where the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals said, "This does not mean that a modest damage award or
settlement should dictate the size of the attorney fee, but at the same
time, it cannot be ignored." 94 The approach advocated by the Eighth
Circuit is consistent with the main thrust of Rehnquist's dissent in
that it forces civil rights attorneys to consider what can reasonably be
expected to be achieved by the litigation when exercising billing
judgment.
Another criticism of Rehnquist's dissent is that it does not address
the application of Marek v. Chesny95 to the award of attorney's fees
under the Fees Act. Marek held that a civil rights defendant is not
liable for attorney's fees incurred subsequent to a pre-trial settlement
offer when the judgment recovered at trial by the plaintiff is less than
the settlement offer. While the threat of exorbitant fees should not
chill good faith defenses to a civil rights action, a civil rights defendant
should also realize that a reasonable settlement offer to a bona fide
claim is a sensible way to limit exposure to excessive attorney's fees.
As long as district courts are willing to hand out astronomical attor-
ney's fees, the pragmatic defense counsel should bear in mind the pos-
sibility of a settlement offer.
VI. NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF THE FEES ACT
City of Riverside v. Rivera illustrates the need for legislative re-
form of the Fees Act and is by no means an isolated case.96 Rivera and
91. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs at 5913.
92. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2703-04 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
93. 710 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1983).
94. 1& at 461. In Jacquette, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a requested
attorney's fee of over $90,000 was properly reduced to nearly $20,000 where the
prevailing plaintiff settled an employment discrimination suit for $1,500.
95. 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
96. Other examples include: Grendel's Den Inc. v. Larsen, 749 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1985)
(fee award of $133,000 for the preservation of a liquor license on constitutional
grounds); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983) (fee award of over
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cases like it have transformed the Fees Act from what was originally
intended to assure victims of civil rights violations access to the judi-
cial system into a vehicle by which overzealous attorneys enrich them-
selves at the expense of the public. The judicial system has simply
failed to provide any objective force to the definition of a reasonable
fee and appears at least partially willing to assist those lawyers who
are exploiting the Fees Act. Legislation requiring a more definite
standard of a reasonable fee should therefore be considered.
This Note proposes legislative revision that would return the Fees
Act to its original purpose, promoting the vindication of civil rights
while preventing windfalls to attorneys. Because many of the
problems with the current system involve litigious attorneys exercis-
ing poor billing judgment, 97 the proposed reforms are aimed at assur-
ing that both hours billed and rates charged are reasonable.
Reasonable hourly rates could be guaranteed by standardizing al-
lowable fees. Rates charged could be based on the experience level of
the attorney and systematically determined from a rate table.98 This
system would compensate civil rights attorneys at approximately the
same rate that attorneys of like experience would command in the
private sector. The greatest virtue of a rate table would be the high
level of objectivity and simplicity. By providing hourly compensation
at the same rate available in the private sector, a rate table would pro-
mote sufficiently vigorous enforcement of civil rights while prevent-
ing exorbitant fees.
Providing a guarantee that the number of hours billed is reason-
able poses a more difficult problem. This Note proposes that new leg-
islation emphasize three concepts to curb the temptation of attorneys
to overlitigate their cases: (1) a nationwide requirement of meticulous
time records as a prerequisite to a fee award, (2) close scrutiny of fees
$700,000 in prison reform litigation); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (fee award of $160,000 for recovery of $31,000 in back pay).
97. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
98. Kimble, Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Cases: An Essay on Streamlining the For-
mulation to Attract General Practitioners, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 373, 391 (1985).
Kimble gives as an example of a rate table that utilized by the Community Legal
Services of Philadelphia. The rate table is:
Category Range of Hourly Rates
Law Students $30.00 - $50.00
Attorneys with post law school experience under two $60.00 - $85.00
years
Attorneys with 2-5 years experience $80.00 - $120.00
Attorneys with 6-10 yeras experience $100.00 - $160.00
Attorneys with more and 10 years experience $125.00 - $180.00
Supervising Attorneys, Project Heads, Managing $130.00 - $200.00
Attorneys, Deputy Director, Executive Director
Paralegals I and II $30.00 - $40.00
Senior and Supervisory Paralegals $40.00 - $60.00
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requested for unsuccessful claims, and (3) use of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 sanctions against attorneys submitting exorbitant fee
requests.
The requirement of meticulous time records is not a new idea.99
However, strict application of a rule requiring precise time records
would be helpful in assisting courts in setting accurate and equitable
fees and would also place defense counsel in a position to make an
informed decision concerning the propriety of the fee request. 00 The
following items should be required: daily time sheets of all attorneys
involved, written statements describing the precise nature of the
work performed, and classification of all time worked into the various
categories of claims pursued in the litigation.01 These strict require-
ments for time records would provide a strong foundation from which
a reasonable fee could be determined.
Close scrutiny of fees requested for claims not prevailed on in the
litigation is also needed. This Note proposes that Hensley's "common
core of facts" 10 2 test for determining whether a plaintiff recovers on
unsuccessful claims be eliminated and that a stricter test be substi-
tuted. The proposed test would force courts to view fee awards from a
results-oriented standpoint. Using the meticulous time records sug-
gested above, billable hours could be divided between those hours
spent on successful claims and those spent on unsuccessful claims.' 03
Hours spent on successful claims would be presumed reasonable un-
less the defendant could show otherwise. On the other hand, hours
spent on unsuccessful claims would be presumed to be excluded from
the fee award unless plaintiffs counsel could prove in light of all the
circumstances that there was a reasonable possibility of success on the
claim and that the hours spent pursuing such a possibility were rea-
sonable. By placing the burden on plaintiff's counsel to rebut a pre-
sumption of unreasonability for hours spent on unsuccessful claims,
courts could force civil rights attorneys to seriously consider the wis-
99. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir.
1983); Natl Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319,
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (both cases requiring meticulous time records as a pre-requi-
site to a fee recovery).
100. Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
101. See Envtl. Defense Fund Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency 672 F.2d 42, 54 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (providing examples of what the court believed was more than ade-
quate documentation of time records).
102. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).
103. At times, of course, it may be impossible for the attorney to determine how much
time should be allocated to one claim or another. For instance, the attorney in
developing the facts of the case will not necessarily know to which claim the time
should be assigned. In such marginal cases, the court should allow the attorney to
assign the time to the successful claim because the fact-finding process is a neces-
sary and reasonable step in the litigation process.
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dom of pursuing collateral issues when the likelihood of success on
such issues is minimal. Thus, the proposed reform would encourage
civil rights attorneys to sensibly limit their research in light of reason-
able expectations of success.
Finally, Congress should consider the imposition of sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for exorbitant fee requests.
Possibilities include monetary sanctions of consequential attorney's
fees for defendants opposing an exorbitant fee request as well as judi-
cial reprimand of an offending attorney.104 If civil rights attorneys
knew that sanctions would be consistently applied when exorbitant
fees were requested, they would be more likely to limit fees requested
to reasonable sums. The liklihood of a swift resolution of the issue of
attorney's fees would be increased and judicial resources previously
spent litigating awards of attorney's fees would be saved for more
pressing matters.105 Sanctions for exorbitant fee requests should
therefore be considered as a possible component of an incentive struc-
ture to ensure that fees requested are reasonable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Exorbitant attorney's fees awards like the award in City of River-
side v. Rivera are literally too much of a good thing. Fee awards are
necessary to ensure vigorous enforcement of civil rights, but exorbi-
tant fee awards go beyond that purpose, enriching litigious attorneys
at the expense of the public whose interest is supposedly served. Rec-
ognizing that the enforcement of civil rights is not without costs, this
Note advocates reforms which seek to ensure that both hours billed
and rates charged are reasonable. Civil rights attorneys would
thereby be required to exercise meaningful billing judgment when liti-
gating their cases. By providing a measure of objective force to the
definition of a "reasonable" fee, the reforms suggested would return
the Fees Act to its original purpose, promoting the vindication of civil
rights while precluding unjustified windfalls for attorneys.
Gregory Scott Heier '88
104. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 201-05 (1985) (provides complete summary of sanctions available
under FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
105. In Hensley v. Echerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), Justice Brennan said that litigation
concerning the amount of a fee award "must be one of the least socially produc-
tive types of litigation imaginable .... " Id. at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan's statement is based on the fact that
"attorney's fee appeals take up lawyers' and judges' time that could more profita-
bly be devoted to other cases, including the substantive civil rights claims that
§ 1988 was meant to facilitate." Id. at 455 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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